The optimum collective consuming community / 166 by Hillman, Leo


Faculty Working Papers
THE OPTIMUM COLLECTIVE CONSUMING COMMUNITY
Leo Hillman
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

FACULTY WORKING PAPERS
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
February 28, 1974
THE OPTIMUM COLLECTIVE CONSUMING COMMUNITY
Leo Hillman
#166

THE OPTIMUM COLLECTIVE CONSUMING COMMUNITY 1
by
Leo Hillman
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois
February, 1974
This paper is based on Chapters Three, Four, and Five of my
doctoral dissertation written at the University of Pennsylvania under
Albert Ando and Wilfred Ethier. I should also like to thank Noel Edelson
and Robert Inman for helpful comments and advice, as well as Takashi
Takayama for a careful reading of the paper.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/optimumcollectiv166hill
THE OPTIMUM COLLECTIVE CONSUMING
COMMUNITY
Leo Hillman
ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on a collective-consuming com-
munity such as would provide a locational option to consumers
in a surrogate locational market in collective goods. A
model is presented, wherein the provision of collective
consumption to community members takes place via a collec-
tive consumption technology which generalizes the pure pub-
lic good to allow for replication, congestion and rivalry.
Each of these concepts is formally defined for the community
with reference to its available collective consumption tech-
nology. The standard small country model of international
trade describes production and intercommunal trade, with an
intermediate and non-tradeahle good linking the production
and consumption technologies. The community is given the
discretion to choose a consumption vector and its member-
ship size. Comparative statics results indicate quali-
tative differences in optimum community configurations.
The paper, by providing a reference optimum outcome for a
collective consuming community, provides a frame of refer-
ence for considering market failures in a locational
market for collective goods.
*
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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I. INTRODUCTION
Samuelsori's pseudo-market algorithm for the attainment of Pareto
efficiency in an economy with pure public goods demonstrated the public good
market failure to be a consequence of non- revelation of consumer prefer-
1 2
ences. In a classic paper Charles Tiebout proposed that preference re-
velation would be evoked in the act of locational choice if communities
provided diverse collective consumption offerings to their members. Then,
with community membership acting as an exclusionary device, a market in
collective goods via locational choice would function as a surrogate for
Samuelson's centralized competitive pseudo-market with its omniscient
Walrasian auctioneer.
The fundamental institutional characteristic of a locational market in
collective goods is the existence of collective consuming communities pro-
viding locational options to consumers. This paper focuses on such a
community. We describe the structure of a model of a collective consuming
community and then proceed to consider the nature of the choice process en-
tailed in establishing an optimum community. This optimum community pro-
vides a frame of reference against which to view prospective market failures.
However, the analysis of market failures and corrective policies is beyond
3
the scope of this paper.
In considering the nature of a collective consuming community, we shall
make three important departures from the way such a community was
orginally envisaged by Tiebout. First, whereas Tiebout assumed that each
4
community ha d a given collective good expenditure pattern , we shall be
interested in the community's optimum level of collective consumption as a
decision variable. Collective consumption will be viewed as provided via a
collective consumption technology, which generalizes the polar pure public
good to incorporate the implications of congestion, replication and rivalry.
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Secondly, Tiebout assumed, all incomes to be derived from dividends; but we
shall view the community as confronted with production and trading opportu-
nities no different from those standardly attributed to a small trading nation.
The distribution of aggregrate income is presented as determined via a
property rights assignment rule implicit in the community's tax schedule,
which causes community members' incomes to be functionally dependent on
the size of community membership.
Thirdly, optimum community membership size is determined explicitly
in the process of the solution to an economically motivated optimization
problem. Tiebout proposed on the other hand that, in order to avoid repli-
7
cation, a fixed factor was required to constrain community expansion; while
with constant returns in the provision of collective services, a sociological
g
variable would explain the institutional existence of communities. Our
model does not begin with the allocation of a fixed amount of land to the
community. We assume the shaddow price of land to be zero, the community
always being able to physically accommodate a marginal member who, once
settled, proceeds to purchase housing services as a component of his private
good consumption. Rather than geographical boundaries or sociological
motivations, it is efficiency in sharing with constrains community expansion.
The paper proceeds along the following lines. In part 2 the structure of
the model of the collective consuming community is described. Part 3 formu-
lates the community's optimum choice problem, with three discretionary
variables, private good consumption, collective consumption and community
membership size being chosen to maximize community social welfare.
Comparative statics results are presented in part 4, and some concluding
remarks are contained in part 5.
2. THE MODEL
2. I. Community Welfare
-
-
i i r- i - i i 1 1 -if- i * imi - .
.
Our first need is to provide an interpretation of community welfare
9
when community size is itself a decision variable. Let us suppose that:
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A. 1. Community membership can be dichotomized into those consumers
who are locationally committed to the community (denoted LCC's) and
consumers who are not so committed (denoted non-LCC's).
A framework for motivating the dichotomy postulated in A. I is pro-
vided by Albert Hirschman 1 s "exit, voice, and loyalty. " LCC's are de-
fined as "loyal" to the community, while non-LCC's are defined to display no
commitment to community membership, being prepared to "exit" if superior
alternative locational options present themselves. Along with "loyalty" comes
effective "voice," and we assume;
A. 2: only LCC preferences count in the determination of the community's
social preference ordering over private and collective consumption.
We further assume:
A. 3: all final consumption can be dichotomized into a composite commodity,
private good consumption, and a flow of collective services provided by an
aggr.egative collective consumption technology (to be defined).
A. 4; LCC social preferences are representable by the continuous, strictly
concave, twice differentiate strictly increasing function
(2.1) W « » (x, g)
W
i
>
'
{W
ij
}<
°> ***
e x
» s
where g denotes the flow of collective services consumed by all community
members and x denotes per capita LcC private good consumption. Until
part 4 we assume neither good to be inferior.
Observe that community size does not enter directly into welfare
determina-tion, utility being defined in the traditional manner as an ordering
exclusively over final goods consumed. Note further that W is strictly con-
cave. Any non- convexities arising out of the existence of collective con-
sumption manifest themselves in the constraint binding on W in (x, g}
space, not in the function W (x, g) itself. The nature of the constraint on
LCC welfare is determined jointly by the community's collective consumption
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technology, its production and trading possibilities, and any community property
rights assignment rule which brings the welfare of non-LCC's to bear on
ft (x, g ). Together, these influences establish LCC income and the
relative price of collective in terms of private consumption. This price -
income information in turn specifies the LCC feasible choice set in {x,g}
space.
2.2 Th e Collective Consumpt ion T echnology "
A. 5: Assume there exists a continuum of consumers, with the units of
measurement of community size defined so that N=l is the number of LCC's
and N = I is the lower bound to N.
A. 6: It is possible to view the collective facilities provided by the community
for its members as an aggregrative structure, denoted in dimension by A
Definition 1: A collective consumption technology is a relationship
(2.2) g = g* (H t A)
(2.2a) g * 0, A > 0, N * 1 , g* * , gj >
which describes the nature of the collective consumption possibilities open
to a collective consuming community.
I.e.
,
for a given facility capacity and community membership, the
collective cor sumption technology inr^cates the magnitude of the collective
service flow to community members, An increase in facility capacity with
community size unchanged increases the flow of collective services; while
increasing community size and keeping facility capacity fixed fails to reduce
the flow of collective services, only in the special pure public good case
where g# = a.
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Let '/*v denote the percentage change in a variable,
differentiating (2.2) logarithmically yields
Then totally
(2.3)
where
(2.4)
g = yti + £A
Y = gN
T-l
dA=*0
- Ng"
X
g*
N £
(2.5) C 2 A
.-i
dN*0 A.g"
X
.g*
A
>
Y and £ are two characteristic elasticities of the collective consumption
technology. We can interpret Y as a congestion elasticity; it indicates the
percentage decline in the collective service flow to community members
when community siae increases by one percent and no compensating addition
is made to the community's collective facility capacity. £ is on the other
hand a replication elasticity indicating the percentage increase in collective
services when, at a given community size, the collective facility capacity is
enlarged by one percent.
A third characteristic elasticity of the collective consumption technology
and the one that we shall have most c use to be interested in - is established
by rearranging terms in (2. 3) to yield
(2.3a) A - C g - S
*
(2. 3a) implicitly defines what we shall term the community's rivalry elasticity
(2.6) n = A n
:-i
dg-0 •C
1
Y £
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The rivalry elasticity r l . accordingly denotes the percentage increase in
community size necessary to sustain a given collective service flow to
community members, when coinmunity membership size increases by one
percent.
The terms congestion and rivalry have generally been used interchangeably
in the collective consumption literature, "f and t\ however offer a formal
distinction within the context of a community's application of its collective
consumption technology. Y is a measure of crowding for a given collective
facility capacity and thus suggests conge stability. n on the other hand
the
views crowding from perspective of the maintainance of a given collective
service flow, and this we take to be suggestive of the degree of rivalry in
collective consumption. It is evident from (2.6) that the congestion and rivalry
elasticities of the community's collective consumption technology are equal in
absolute value, and so constitute symmetrical measures of crowding, only if
y * r\ « or £ * 1..
The freedom we have in specifying a collective consumption technology is
analogous to that entailed in the specification of a production technology. As
our general frame of reference we propose .
Definition 2: A reference collective consumption technology is described by
(2. 2) with r S , A >0 , N* 1 , . > 0, and additional attributes
(i) g*
N
•
; g* <
AA
> <
(iii) g*NA
-
. but g*
NA
* at each level of g for
some sufficiently large combination of N and A,
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We assume
A. 7: the community's collective consumption technology is as described in
definition 2.
The reference technology is depicted in tS>Nj space in figure 1.
For any facility capacity, there exists a relationship between g and N, with
successively higher contours representative of larger collective facility
capacities. The congestion elasticity Y is the point elasticity on an iso -
" contour. Attribute (i) of definition 2 permits a facility to be marginally
noncongestible only at N = 1.
8
...A 3 >A 2>Ai
g
N
Figure 1 Figure 2
We can view figure las depicting the collective consumption technology in iti
inverse form1-
,
(2.7) A « A* (N,g).
Analogously, figure 2 depicts the collective consumption technology in its
- 13inverse form,
(2.8) N = N* (g,/\)
Each iso - N contour describes the transformation frontier between g and A
at a given community size. The highest contour represents the minimal
community membership size N = 1, with lower frontiers corresponding to
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successively larger community sizes. £ is the elasticity at a point on
an iso - N contour.
Now consider the third characteristic of the collective consumption
r-1
technology, rivalry. We have obsen ed that H = -E, y and so rivalry
is conceptually a combination of the congestion and replication characteristics
of the collective consumption technology. Graphically, we depict rivalry as
the point elasticity on an iso -g contour in \A,Nj- space, as in figure 3.
The properties of such iso-g contours are of fundamental importance, since
they determine whether the collective consumption technology in itself
endogenously constrains community expansion; for each contour indicates the
circumstances under which a given collective service flow can be maintained
when both community membership size and the congestible collective facility
are enlarged. If both the latter can be increased without any constraining
influence being exerted by the collective consumption technology, then we
would need to resort to employing some fixed factor as the determinant of
community size.
The iso-g contours in figure 3 exhibit A*jj > ^ and
^*jjn
> ®'
From (2. 7.) and (2. 7) we obtain
(2,9) dA
dN
. n
L
n . s r 8 a J
ag«*0
A* like its elasticity analogue n , is positive, since if g is to
remain unchanged when membership size is enlarged, some compensatory
marginal addition must be made x.o the community's collective facility.
From (2. 9)
(2.10) dfA I
_
-1
dN2 |dg«0 M K 8 AN 8 ^' g ft
It might be intuitively evident - or in any event we shall make it explicitly
clear below when considering the relationship between the collective
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consumption technology and the cost of collective consumption - that A\jTsf °
is a necessary condition for the collective consumption technology to mitigate
against unbounded community expansion. I.e.
,
just asg* < ° indicates in-
creasing congestion of a given facility capacity, we require A* > ° toNN
indicate increasing rivalry as the congestible facility is replicated and
community membership size is enlarged.
In (2. 10) the critical term is g* . If g* > 0, thenA*. | 0; but if
g*„. T~ 0> then A* > 0. Attribute (iii) of definition 2 guarantees that the&
A N NN to
<
reference technology exhibits g* * 0, and so Ifr „> 0, for sufficiently largeAN NN
combinations of N and A on an iso-g contour. The justification for proposing
A
o r
• •g«+ > g3 >g2 >gl
N
Figure 3
this relationship rests on the two perspectives on the cross-term g* .
On the one hand, viewed as dg* /9A , we would acknowledge the congestionN
reducing effects of increasing facility size and so suggest g* >0. But
illN
from the perspective of dg* / dN, a different set of circumstances suggest
themselves. As N and A become large on a given iso-g contour, the negati-
vity of g* is suggested by the replication constraints imposed by the tech-
nology of providing collective services. I.e., at some point, efficiency in
the provision of collective services dictates that LCC's turn away further
consumers to initiate their own collective facility structure,
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rather than have the community accommodate new members by enlarging
its collective facilities. Before we formally consider the relationship
between the costs of collective consumption and the collective consumption
15technology, we need to introduce production and prices.
2. 3 pr e
d
uction
The analogy between the sm . try engaged in international trade and
a community appears quite complete from the viewpoint of production and
markets. Accordingly, we shall adopt the wellknown small country frame of
16
reference for the community. We suppose that competitive community
fir ms produce two outputs, the private good X and a durable intermedia.
good G. The latter is combined with cooperating labor to yield the collective
facility
(2.11) A - A (N
A ,
G)
where N , denotes labor employment in A and G the stream of services frA r
the quantity of G employed in
A 17
« is non-tradeable. Eut the private good X is tradeable for the servii
of G in a world rentals market, in which G can be leased in exchange for a
18flow of 7T units of X per unit of time. At any point in time the community i
endowed with a historically stock of G and LCC's engage in trade to
satisfy their excess demands for G ai IX,
Production uti s two factor inputs. Labor inputs are for convenience
assumed to be equal to community membership and are employed in conjunction
with a generic non- ictors are paid the values of their margin
products. The community's * T e bill is given by wN in terms of the
private good, and we denote aggregrate community non-wage income, derived
from the services of the intermediate good G and the generic non-labor input,
by R,
We further assume that LCC's choice of N leaves the community at an
interior point on it -labor Rybczynski line; so the community remains
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diversified in production and the exogenous terms o£ trade n establish factor
rewards and relative factor isities in production. The community's va-
riable discretionary labor Rybczynski Line is
(2.12) aNX (rr) X + [a^OO + r [ ^]] G « N
where a . denotes a labor -input coefficient and r is the ratio of labor to the
Ni
quantity of G employed in A. The coram.unity's production and trading pos-
sibilities, in conjunction with its collective consumption technology, determine
the relative supply price of collective services. Once LCC income is estab-
lished, the characteristics oi the LCC feasible choice set binding on W(x, g)
are specified, and. we can then proceed to consider the nature of the solutk
to the community's optimization problem.
2.4 The LCC Feasible Choice Set
In establishing the LCC feasible choice set, we assume:
A. 8: collective consumption is financed so that all community members pay an
equal tax-price for collective services.
19
Let p denote the per capita collective consumption tax price and let y denote
LCC income, where both, p and y are expressed in terms of the private goo I
as numeraire. The LCC feasible choice set can now be denoted as S(p.
, y).
A. 9: I-,et the community operate A with a balanced budget, such th
(2,13) eg - pA.A
where 8 denotes the relative supply price of a unit of collective services anc
is the relative price of r >llective facility, given as a consequence of cost
minimization by
^ ( \
00(2.14) Pa(<0 - w(tt) . a.T . " * •'] 7r.a_ A |—*-rA NA [ r J GA [ it
[n (2,14) a and a a- ipectively the unit is
NA
and intermediate good input co< Lents for the collective facility.
I i pect soquant cost-minimizing labor
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When we substitute (2. 7) ior the collective consumption technology into (2.13)
and solve for 6 ( we obtain
(2.15) 6*(g,N|7r) - pA (ir) . f
l
. fi*(N,g)
I.e., the supply price of collective services depends upon the collective servi.
flow and member sh ze that JLCC'2 might choose. Noting that p = 9 /N,
we obtain by differentiation of (2. 15) the two dimensions of marginal cost in the
community's provision of collective services to its members,
(2.16) 9* -•• 8 g
~X (C1-!) | as C | 1
(2.17) 0* . Qif1 n ffi pn = o
Observe that (2. 17) provides us with another interpretation of the rivalry
elasticity; H is equal to the elasticity of the supply price of collective services
with respect to community membership size for a given level of collective
consumption.
Our interest is in establishing the slope of the LCC budget constraint.
From (2.15),
(2.18) P*(g,N/7r) =0 *(g >N/Tr)N*"
1
So marginal variations in community collective consun ption and members!
size respectively affect p via
(2.19) P* g - Pg"
1
(cf
1
-!)^ as K L 1
(2.20) p* = pN"1 ( n-i) «o as n ~ IN > >
Now consider the second aspect of the LCC feasible choice set, LCC
income y. Suppose that the distributive content of the community's taxation
system. - as distinct from, the per capita obligation to pay for collective
services - can be expressed in the form
(2.21) y(N) - v + ot(N) R(N) if1

where {a|0 - a N} is r* variable income distribution parameter
and Ry = 0.(2.21) is a general property rights assignment rule defining
the dependence of LCC income on community size. The characteristics
the function &(N) are determined by the specific nature of the community'?
tax system. For example-; a (N) - N is an extreme rule which grants all
property rights to the community' s non-wage income to LCC ! s, while cx(N)
secures an egalitaran income distribution. Observe that °K«)/N is LCC's
post -tax share of non-wage income and sc y ^ y as c^ = 1 ,
where y denotes LCC per capita™ income. Generally, from (2. 21),
(2.22) yN -
*™~2 ibm J - ^ - lj
where Eij denotes an elasticity.
Substituting (2. 18) and (2. 21) into the LCC budget constraint, we obtain
the equation of the LCC feasible choice frontier
(2.23) x + o* (g,KJ7T) g « y(N) = w + aRN*" 1
(2.19), (2. 20) and (2. 22) describe variations in the feasible choice set that
occur when marginal changes are made in the community's level of collective
consumption and its membership size.
2. OPTIMAL CHOICE
3. I The Oene-al Solution in (*,gj Sp-.ce.
LCC's choose x, g and N to maximize N(x»g) subject to {2. 23), The
lagrangian is
(3.1) L - W(x,g) + a[x + p*(g,N) g - y(N)]
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where ^ is a lagrangian multiplier, and the. necessary first order conditions
for a constrained local extremum are
(3.2) I - W + \ «
(3.3) ^
g
- W
g
+ X(p* g + p*) -
(3.4) l
x
- x + oAg - y *
(3.5) LN
s
;
- yN
assuming
Eliminating A from (3 ad (3. 3) and substituting (2. 19) for p* secures
(3 A\ pC » tf W
~
J
'
= MRS
Since P - 9/N
„
(3. 6) can be expressed as
(3.6a) e^"1 » N . MS - J MRSgx
|5j gx
64" is the marginal cost of collective consumption in terms of private
consumption as determined via the collective consumption technology. (3. 6a)
is therefore the generalization of Samuelson's well-known necessary condition
for a Pareto efficient combination of collective and private consumption to be
realized. Observe however that the particular marginal rate of substitution
being summed is that of. LCC!s whose preferences are imposed on the
community at large.
Consider now the conditio he term -g. p* indicates
the change in consumer ?- as measured by the compensating variation*
when community size is marginally enlarged at a given level of collective
consumption. Note that if p* < 0, so that a marginal new community
member depresses p, then consumer surplus increases: and vice-versa
if p*N
>
. y„ indicates the change in LCC income when there ir. a marginal
increase in community size. Accordingly (3. 5) requires that in equilibrium
the change in the compensating variation be equal to minus the LCC income
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change when community si^e is marginally enlarged.
Finally (3.4) is the standard requirement that in commodity space optimal,
choices of x arid g lie along the frontier of the feasible choice set, which in
this case is itself specified by the choice of g and N.
The first order conditions are solvea in a two step procedure. First
solve (3. 2) - (3. 4} for the demand functions
( 3 - 7 ) gD
<N,g) « g* [p*(N,g), y(K)]
(3.8) XD (N,g) - X* [p*<H f g),y(H)3
and a . Values of N and g specify a feasible choice set in commodity space
via P and y, and (3. ?) and (3. 8) yield preferred consumption choices from, a
given feasible choice set.
The first order condition remaining, (3. 5), establishes the community's
efficient sharing locus in (N, g ) Epace, So (3. 5) and either one of the
demand functions (3. 7) and (3. 8) constitute two equations in N and g. A
solution for private good consumption x is then attainable via the budget
constraint. Accordingly, an optimum solution, if it exists, simultaneously
specifies an optimum choice set in commodity space and a choice of collect,
and private consumption and from the set.
3.2 Replication and Convexity of. the Feasible Choice Set
As a prer to obi .
:
ue solution to the above problem, we
require that from any one giver feasible choice set S[p,y]
,
there exist a
uniquely preferred consumption vector specified by the first order conditions;
i.e., we require S[p,y] to convex set.
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Holding community membership size constant, we obtain for the slope
of the feasible choice frontier
(3.9)
(3.10)
dx
- pf1 <
dN=0
2
~2 m p5 5a a - i 1 p 3dg dN=0
Thus £ gives rise to potential nonconvexities in S[p,y] and suitable
restrictions on *» will establish S[p,y] as convex. The types of
restrictions that are needed eliminate increasing proportionate returns to
tr
<
r Kfacility replication. For example, £a * and c, ~ together make
(3.10) negative and ensure that S[p,y] is a strictly convex set. A more
stringent condition is to assume 5 = 1, thus eliminating decreasing as well
as increasing returns. In the latter case {2. 19), (3. 9) and (3. 10) indicate the
feasible choice frontier to be linear.
3. 3 Existence and Uniqueness in an Expository Community .
We shall now provide a more exact exposition of the nature of the solution
to the optimum collective consuming problem. We do this by. making some
specific expository assumptions about the community's collective consumption
technology and its property rights assignment rule.
A 10:(i) First, in the light of section 3. 2 above, we assume that 5 -1 .
Thus the scale of provision of g does not enter into the determination of the costs
collective consumption.
(ii) Secondly, we assume the collective consumption to exhibit ^(1) = 0» ^n
and r\ > 0; i.e., collective consumption is marginally non~rivalrous
at N = 1, but beyond N = 1 rivalry as measured by n increases at an in-
creasing rate.
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(iii) Thirdly, suppose the community's tax system implies a property rights
assignment rule tor Oi(Il)
,
such that
(3.11) EaN I X * EWi as «<r' 5 x
and assume that y > y . LCC's accordingly suffer an income loss whenever
community size is marginally expanded. We shall further assume that in
(3.11) the elasticities ,, and ... are constant.
For a collective -consuming community described by A10, we can establish
the following propositions;
Proposition 1: AI0(i) implies that the feasible choice set's position in (x,g}
space is independent of the choice of collective consumption and is completely
specified by a choice of community size.
Proof: From {2. 19),
exception of p* (!)
P*
. However, with the
* P*N^0 > so p varies with N. y depends upon
N only via (2.21), so the feasible choice set is specified by S[p(N), y(N)]=S(N)
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 : A10(i) and A10 (ii) imply that P depends only upon the commui
size chosen, not the level of collective consumption, and P(N) attains a unique
minimum as depicted in figure 4.
=
Proof; Since n 5-1 P*(N,g) = p(N) . From (2. 20), p(N) attains
extremum whore N-l. Since ri ' , the extremum is a global minimum,
N
Q.E.D.
e.p
Figure 4
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Since in (2. 17) ~"0 , the supply price of collective services is an
increasing function of N for r> '•' ij . But although ^ is monotonically in-
creasing as community size is enlarged, p is decreasing over that range of
N where T)<1. For over the latter e of N the gams from sharing the
costs of collective consu »n with a margin; / community member
exceed the costs incurred, i ase in £ enlarging the collective
facility to maint?,in a given collective service flow to community members.
Following from proposition 2 we have
Propos ition^: Let Nm denote the community membership size at which P
attains a minimum; i. e. . min p = p (N^). Then the community's optimal
choice of membership size is less than Nm .
Proof: An optimal choice of N must satisfy the first order condition (3. 5).
Since by A10 (iii) y„ < , the optimal choice of community size must lie in
the range of N where P^< . e. , optimal N must be less than N . Q. E. D,
.Clearly if y« • , optimal N can be no greater than N , since for
N > W we have p> and the change in the compensating variation, due
to a marginal expansion in community size is negative. This would mean th
community members are prepared to forego some income to prevent the tax-
price change Induced by the addition at a marginal consumer to the commun,
from coming into effect. Symmetrically, they would be prepared to bribe som*
of their fellow members to leave the community.
Proposition I implies that the demand for collective services given
(3. 7) can be expressed as
(3.7a) g •= g[p(N), y(N)3 =
{
-
I.e. , for a given value of N and specification of a feasible choice set S(N) ,
some collective demand g is chosen. The first order condition (3. 5) can be
expressed is
(3. 5a) g = yN p~N
- ?£
(N)
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where o-^O is the minimal level of collective consumption required for
sharing efficiency o tie range of N. As described in the general case in
section 3.1. above, the . on to the corn optimal choice problem is
obtained by solving th actions inthe space of g and N, £D (N) and
gE CO.
Consider first the nature of the function gpOOs
proposition 4; The sharing efficiency function SgQO is bounded at N = N
and is eithei monotonically increasing for {] s= m < n } or has a global
m
minimum. Sp(^) is positive and finite.
See figure 5 .
Proof: Substituting (2. 20) and (2. 22) into (3. 5a) and setting c = EaH + ^
we obtain
U,3DJ Hw d(n-i)
From (3.5b), g (1) - -c a (I) 11(1.) 0™
1
> and 11m gr - °° .
m
Logarithmically di fferentiating (3. 5a) we obtain in elasticity terms, using
primes now to denote differentiation with respect to N,
(3.12) gl(N) * g_ N (E ,„ - E ,„)
Therefore &"(%) * as F
Consider E i« . Evalua this elasticity yields
(3.13) e
,
5-n P"p 5 - [<2-n) + n'Nd-n)"1 )! > c
'n<i
Differentiation of (3. I • th respect to N then yields after collection of terms
{3, 14) E' » (i-n)"'
1
[roT + n"N + n'Na-n)"1 ] > o

:o-
Now consider EyfR . '. , Multiplying out this elasticity yields
(3.15) e t H = -» y" y
!
- -c > o
'
^TSince the elasticities ~q>j and **j^ have been assumed constant and
c SE
cffi
+ E
RN~
1 we obtain upon differentiating (3.15), E f = 0.
Figure 5 depicts the two possible outcome tth respect to ^ »^ and
E ,„ . In figure 5a E ,„(1)<E f „(l) , so an extremum for g_(N) exists,
y N ° p'N x ' y N &£1
Since the second order condition for a minimum for g (N) is g', > E T »
p • N y N
the unique extremum is a minimum. In figure 5b E ,. T (1)>E 7fvr(i) , so
g^tN) is monotonical ly increasing,
Q. E.D.
E
p'N
E
y'N
N
g
(a)
/ I
y/
g£
(N)
j
N
a
(b)
J_- N
N
M
Figure 5
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i
Now consider the demand function for collective services in the space of
I and N
.
Proposition 5; The function g (N) i" characterized by
(i) g'
D
(N) > gD
(N) > g£
(N)
(ii) S
f
D
(N) = if gD
(N) < gE
(N) and n<l
(iii) g' (N) < n * 1
Proof: Differentiation of(3. ?a) yields
(3.i6) g' D(W - ip pn + Iy yN
Applying the Slutsky - Hicks decomposition to g , we obtain after re-
irrangement of terms
(3.16a) g' D (N) = PN -gp
+ g
y
(yN
- g p^
dy-0
(3. 16a) decomposes the response of demand for collective services by
XC's to a marginal increase in community size into a substitution effect
tnd an income effect. If n<l then we can substitute (3. 5a) into (3.16a) to
>btain
(3.16b) *VN>| ^ -Pn{-8P + «y (8D (N) "" SE (N) '}
[ n<i dy*0
i) Consider (3. l6bl Since n<l we have ) > . The substitution
' N
iffeet (-g-p) is positive, a marginal increase in N causing consumers to
substitute collective for private goods at a constant level of income. Collective
consumption is not an ior good, so g > : accordingly if
5D
(N) > gE
(N), then g^l 0.
ii) But if in (3. l6b) %-q^ k 8g00 , then the substitution and income effects
>f a marginal increase in community size operate in different directions and
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PN - and so the substitution effect is(iii) In(3.l6a) if H - 1 , then
negative. The Income effect is also negative, so 8 d^ <
Q. E. D.
(a)
(b)
g
gE
(S)
i y
i
!
1 N 3
i » OiOO
! i
jj^SaOO
Nu N
m
Figare 6 Figure 7
The three characteristic omes to the solution of g (N) and g_(N) are
depicted in figures 6a and 7a, In figure 6 a there are two solutions at tN-^gjJ
and [N5 »g«] . yields a unique solution,
while in the case of S^' no solution exists.
With reference to figures 6b and 7b, we can state
Proposition 6; (i) If two solutions exist as in figure 6, then IXC welfare
attains a local maximum g~] and a local minimum at [?} ,g ].
(ii) If the solution is unique as in the case of g (N) in figure 7, then the
solution indicates a global maximum for L.CC welfare.
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(iii) If no solution exists as in the case of g (N) in figure 7, then LCC
/elfare is a monotonically declining function of community size. This is also
o if a unique solution is obtained as a tangency of gD(N) and gTr (N).
3roof
: Consider the indirect LCC social welfare function
3.17) 9(N) - WpOO, y(N)3
)ifferentiating (3.17) we obtain
3.18) UL - p., + \\i y„
' N p Iv yy J N
3.18) implies that for n » 1. ffi < 0.
N
For n<l (3.18) can be rewritten as
03. 19) $N - % V 1 * yN PN^ *y pN •
n<i
Since g » ^
p
iff
1
and from (3.5a) g£ (N)
- yN
p" 1 , we obtain from C3.19)
(3.19a) iU - [g
D
(N) - gE
(N» (-PK)^y .
'n<i
Therefore ^ = as gD (N)
= g£
(N). Q.E.D.
Observe that the sharing efficiency function g-rp(N) is specified by the
;omrnunity ! s collective consumption technology and its property rights
assignment rule, while the collective demand function gn(N) reflects LCC
^references in consumption. A collective demand function such as g_.(N) in
iigure 7 is representative of preferences relatively biased towards collective
consumption. At N = I, although LCC's alone pay for collective consumption,
g_(l) > gp(l). As N is enlarged, the indirect social welfare function ^, (N)
attains a global maximum at a community size of N^.
On the other hand, preferences underlying a collective demand function
such as g.pp(N) in figure 7 are biased in favor of private consumption. LCC's
demand no collective consumption at all until collective costs can be shared
with at least N^ community members. An optimum community size in ex-
:ess of N = 1 need then not necessarily exist. In the case depicted, the sub-
stitution effect towards collection consumption as community size is enlarged
beyond N 3 is not sufficiently strong to lift gn(N) above g (N). So
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in figure ?b $2 ^' is rnonotonically decreasing and optimal choice of
community size entails maintaining N = I.
In figure 6 however, although g-p)(U < g Tr (^)j *ne substitution effect does
come to dominate the income effect s .fficiently for collective demand to
attain a minimal efficient sharing level. Then so long as gr)(N) > g-tr (rJ) >
LCC welfare increases as community size is enlarged and tyOO reaches a
maximum at a community size of N_ . iji(SL) will then be a global maximum
if preferences are sufficiently biased in favor of collective consumption to
secure 9(1) < ?flL) 21 .
The direct utility, commodity space analogue of $(N) is depicted in
figure 8 . A choice of community size specifies a feasible choice set. From
the three feasible choice sets §(i)
,
S($L) and 2(N ) the indicated ore-
ferred consumption choices are* respective iy 3-,, s -> and s . s -. s s is then
the expansion path of consumption choice as N is enlarged over the range
{N|l * N £ N } . Direct utility &(x,g) along &, s s for a choice ofm & 1 2 m
(x, g) from S(S) corresponds to indirect utility 5(S).
^(N:><W
n
Figure 3
3. 4 The Special Case of Mo Income Loss
There are two constraining influences on community size expansion, the
collective consumption technology and the property rights assignment rule.
Suppose however that LCC income were independent of community size; i. e.
,
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the property rights assignment rule as community size was marginally en-
larged entailed y - o. Then the sole mitigating constraint to community
expansion is rivalry in collective cor •sumption. Non-wage income R(N),
which could be viewed as a surrogate for a fixed factor, no longer plays a
role,
Ii y = o, the first order condition (3. 5) becomes g.p^ = o. Accordingly,
a solution requires gjr to be such that P.. = o; i. e.
,
N = N and n = 1.
The community chooses that value of N which minimizes P and g^,(N) = °>
at N = N as depicted in figure 9. Any level of collective consumption
chosen so that rj 1 on the iso-g contour is sharing -efficient.
In the collective demand function, substitute y^ = o into (3.16). Then
gL(N) = g pj- . Since g is a normal good, it is necessarily not a Giffen
good so g < 0. Therefore g' n (N) ; as p = ; i.e., g'jj(N) % as
^ > ^m
or f|
>
^" So collective demand attains a unique maximum at
N = N . See figure 9,
g l-
X
M N
Figure 9
Setting y = o in (3, 18) we obtain as the first order condition for a max-N
> <imum of $(N) , $N « lpp PN . Since ty < 0, ^ = as PN = and so $(N)
attains a global maximum at N = N where H * 1 .
" m
In this degenerate case of y*
T
= o, optimum community size is therefore
independent of preferences over private and collective consumption. The
solution is always at N = N without regard to the properties of the collective
demand fimction. Moreover, a solution always exists if for some community
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size less than N_, a positive demand for collective services exists. Them' r
solution is unique and necessarily indicates, a global maximum for LCC
welfare.
Although optimal N i's independent of preferences, the optimum level of
collective consumption does of couse depend upon collective demand. We
observe then that in the degenerate case of v„ = o. the essential simultaneity
of the solution has a recursive form. Optimal N is determined first by g^(N)
via the collective consumption technology; and then given optimal N, preference
determine optimal g.
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS
We shall now prove some propositions about the comparative statics
properties of the solution obtained in section 3.3. First we assume that a
global maximum for $(N) exists at some N > 1. In the neighborhood of this
equilibrium, we shall consider change s in the supply price of collective con-
sumption, in the community's non-wage income, in the degree of rivalry in
collective consumption, and in preferences. All comparative statics results
follow from effects on the functions gjJN) and g-,(N) of changes in the appro-
priate exogenous varable.
Lemma: Let (K,g) denote an optimal solution such that {l<N<N } 9
and let 3 denote an arbitrary exogenous variable.
Then
dN dgL dgE
(4.1) 7g ~ as ~rr~ ? -v©dB <
_
d3 I*, < d$
,jj
1
" ' d3 d3 dfi dS
S
I. e. , the net shift of the functions gp(N) and gp{N) determines the change in
optimum community size, while the optimum collective consumption choice is
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altered via the shift in gu(N) and the consequent adjustment along gn(N) to the
new equilibrium.
The lemma is evident from an inspection of figure 6 and requires no
formal proof.
3.1 Supply Price > I e c tiye C o ~ ~ xjrn.pt i on
Consider now the effect on optimal choice of N and g when the supply
price of collective services is marginally dec ed. Such a decrease could
occur because of a technical cha n the collective consumption technology
which permitted a greater flow of collective services for any {A ,N} com-
bination. Or r , the relative price of G, might fall. If the latter is the case,
22
suppose that the community imports G in equilibrium.
_P r opo s i t ion 7
;
(i) A decrease in the supply price of collective services
increases optimum membership size if demand for collective consumption
is price inelastic in the neighborhood of the equilibrium; and vice-versa if de-
mand is elastic.
(ii) If collective demand is price -inelastic in the neighborhood of the
equilibrium, a decrease in the supply price of collective consumption increases
the optimal collective consumption level; and if demand is elastic, the change
in optimal collective consumption is qualitatively indeterminate.
Proof : (i) Let &$ denote a marginal change such that u8/dj3<0.
Differentiating g (N) with respect to 3 and noting that dy/d|3=0 f we obtain
dg '" dp d6~ a3
We have
(4.4) d0
=
6 d$
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So using the lemma and observing that in equilibrium g^.
- &JL <
dp g >
= grp, we establish
(4.5) 5- odg < as
(ii) From (4.2) and (4.5)
(4.6)
d3 d£
N dN
dg (N)/d3 > and from propc 5 dg/dN > 0.
Ac cording I dp. > ii dN/d£ > 0; and dg/dp *
3. 2 Non-wage income
if dN/d3 < 0.
Q.E. D.
We consider now the effect on the community's optimal choice of N and g
of a marginal increase in its aggregrate non-wage income. We shall here
relax the assumption that both x and g are both normal goods.
Proposition 8 : (i) Let rn denote LCC's marginal budget share of collective
consumption. Then
dtf > > -"»
dp < °
as m
g <
c (r>~1 )
(ii) If collective consumption is inferior in the neighborhood of the
equilibrium, then dg/dR < ; if collective consumption is not inferior,
then dg/dR | 0.
(4.8)
„ gft |1 . | a(* fi
N
*zE i
dR is
3R 3y
ewin-i]
Noting that p^8/N and m =p 3g/3y
,
proposition 8(i) follows from the lemma
(ii) (4.9) dj[ m dg.
dR dR
+ M dN
dN dI;

-29-
In the neighborhood of the optimum, dg/dN > . If g is inferior, dg(N)/dR<0
and dN/dR < » so dg/dR > • If g is not inferior, dg(N)/dR <
an d dN/dR < , so dg/dR = .
Q. E. D.
Proposition 8(i) :ates that the response of N to a marginal increase in
R depends upon the coliectiv > isumption hnology via H ; or whether or not
collective consumption is inferior via m ; and on the property rights assignment
rule via c
,
To provide some motivation for this result, consider the special case
of no rivalry and an egalitaran property rights assignment. Then n. =» a^d
- > >
c s
-I, so dN/dR « as m « 1
. I. e. , the outcome depends only upon whether
s
or not private consumption is inferior. Should x be inferior, then m < 1
and $ is enlarged; and if x is normal, m < 1 and N declines.
g
Since we generally expect private consumption to be normal, the presumption
is that optimum community size declines if community non-wage income is
marginally increased.
Maintaining c - -I and allowing n >0, we observe that for dN/dR < to
result, x need not be a normal good. The greater is rivalry in equilibrium,
the higher is the benchmark value of m„ - i.e.., the greater the inferiority
of x at which dN/dR = 0.
On the other hand, the effect of the property rights rule is discerned by
permitting c to vary and maintaining H*0 . Then we observe that dN/dR =
as m 5 c. The smaller c, the larger the income loss to LCC's as
g < *
community size is marginally enlarged and the more inferior is x at the
benchmark value of rn where dN/dR * 0.
g
3.3 Rivalry in Colle ctive Consumption
Consider a change m the collective consumption technology which results
in a new rivalry elasticity in equilibrium. I. e, , suppose in figure 10 that the
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community's optimum position is at A and the iso-g contour shifts from g.
\
Figure 10
Proposition 9: A decrease in rivalry - as exemplified by the shift from g-t to
g'2 in Figure 10- increasses both the community's optimum membership size
and its optimum level of collective consumption.
JProof: At A, 9 and y are unaltered by the decrease in rivalry and we have
dg(N)/dn •
. However the efficient sharing level of collective consumption
increases:
(4.10)
Gg
gr dn InT
L - —
-
> o
I l-T)
Therefore from the lemma <&/dT) < 0.
The change in the optimum level of collective consumption is given by
(4.11)
dr; dn j ~
N
r1 V
dn
<
Since dg($)/drj - 0, dg/dfj > and dft/drj < 0, it follows that
dg/dr, < 0..
Q.E. D.
3.4 Prefences
Finally, we have the expected result that:
Proposition 10: A change in LCC preferences in favor of collective consumption
increases the optimum community size and optimum level of collective
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i
consumption; and vice-versa for a change in preferences in favor of private
consumption.
Proof: g_(N) is ind dent of j mces, A change in preferences in favor
-——-—— XL,
of g shifts gj-v(N) vertically upwards in the neighborhood of the equilibrium.
So, by the lemma, both N and g are increased. Conversely, a change in
preferences in favor of private consumption shifts gr>(N) downward decreasing
N and g
.
! Q. E. D.
5. CONCLUSION
The model presented in this paper constitutes a general frame of reference
for describing a collective consuming community and analysing its optimal
23
choice problem. The comparative statics results can be viewed as charac -
terizing the qualitative differences in the choice of discretionary variables
among communities which differ only in the exogenous attribute considered.
The model is intended to be quite general in its applicability. Conceptually,
the frame of reference provided is sufficiently broad to encompass any
institutional collectivity, ranging from a Tiebout -type local community to an
autonomous national state. Differences would manifest themselves in the
nature of the community's aggregrate collective consumption technology and its
property rights assignment rule. Th^ theory of fiscal federalism suggests a
hierarchy of optimum collectivities based on the nature of the collective con-
sumption technology motivating communal action. The property rights assign-
ment rule is in turn implied by a collectivity's approach to vertical equity in
its taxation structure. For example, if the collectivity' is a nation- state,
ethical judgements about income distribution tend to manifest themselves in
a progressive tax system, which is then implicit in the specification of a(N)
as community size is marginally enlarged. A property tax on the other hand
implies a different specification for a(N)
. In each case the income of pre-
existing community members is affected via the impact on the tax base when
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a new consumer joins the community, and by the position the new community
member takes in the structure of progressivity - or otherwise - of the tax
schedule. It is these effects which we have subsumed into the property
rights assignment rule,
The notion of locationally committed consumers has allowed us to
approach the problem of the collectivity making decisions about its constituent
members. We can interpret N = 1 as the number of consumers deciding at a
given point in time how many additional consumers they would optimally pre-
fer to have join them instantaneously as community members. If the number
of consumers that does join them is different from the number preferred, then
from the perspective of locationally committed consumers, there has been a
market failure in the locational market for collective goods. The institutional
nature of the community would then determine the types of policy instruments
availabe to meet the market failure. An autonomous state would of course
have much more discretion in its policy possibilites than, say, a local school
district,. An analysis of such market failures and correctionary policies is an
24
interesting extension of this paper. Here a frame of reference has been
developed for the consideration of such problems -- in addition to the interest
per se in the formulation of a model of an optimum collective consuming
community in a locational market for collective goods.
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Footnotes
1. See Samuelson (1954) and (1969).
2. See Tiebout (1956).
3. On locational market failures and corrective policies, see Hillman
(1973), chapter 7. Note that the type of market failure referred to here is
specific to the community. The question is whether the locational market
in collective goods results in that configuration for the community that
members would optimally choose if they had appropriate discretion. See also
Buchanan and Goetz (1972) and Oakland (1972b), who are concerned whether
the locational market results in a Pare to -optimal allocation of consumers
between two collective- consuming communities.
4. Tiebout has "each (community) announce a different pattern of ex-
penditives on public goods." P. 421.
5. There have been a number of suggested generalizations of Samuelson'
s
polar pure public good. These have taken a number of different directions.
See for example Oakland (1972a), Eliickson (1973) and Kamien, Schwartz and
R.oberts (1973). The approach presented below has most in common with
Buchanan (1965) but is essentially different in that rivalry is not a manifestation
of a consumers subjective preference ordering, but constitutes an objective
technological aspect of collective consumption. For an approach similar to
that developed in this paper, see Inman (1973).
6. There is a natural symmetry between a small trading nation facing
exogenous prices in a world market - id a community of consumers. Moreover,
the conception of a community adopted in this paper encompasses the nation-
state as the highest level in a hierarchy of fiscal federalism. Insofar as the
application is to a nation- state, the country has to be small. It is an easy
modification to introduce discretionary power over prices, but that would add an
unnecessary complication by involving us in optimum tariff arguments.
7. I. e.
,
Tiebout suggested that: "The factor may be the limited land area
of a suburban community, combined with a set of zoning laws against apartment
buildings. It may be the local beach, whose capacity is limited. Anything of
this nature will provide a restraint
. . .
some factor or resource is fixed.
If this were not so, there would be no logical reason to limit community size. . "
P. 419.

11
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8. In his model comparing the efficiency properties of the locational
market with Samuels on' s pseudo-market, Tiebout assumes "that the costs of
additional services are constant. Further, assume that a doubling of the
population means doubling the amount of services required." Then he contends
that under these conditions, with the potential number of communities un-
bounded, "there is no reason why the number of communities will not be
equal to the population . . „ Unless some sociological variable is introduced,
this may reduce the solution of the problem of allocating public goods to the
trite one of making each person his own municipal government. " P. 421.
9. For a. classic perspective on this problem, see Meade (1955).
Meade's concern was that if social welfare were to be defined as an ordering
over a predetermined number of people, some resulting optimality criterion
could deny existence to some part of the group. The possibility of expelling
some part of the group does not arise for us because of the way in which our
problem is formulated. For some additional implications of the sorts of
issues raised by Meade, see Simon (1973).
10. See Hirschman (1970). Tiebout' s approach was to posit "a city
manager who follows the preferences of the older residents of the community. .
P. 419.
11, See also Inrnan (1973).
12.. The existence of this inverse is secured by g;>" > 0.
sfe
13. This inverse exists for N>1 because gv . < 0.
14. Note that the iso - A and iso - N contours in figures 2 and 3 res-
pectively could be viewed as extending into the fourth quadrant. However, we
have assumed in (la) that W^ 0. a rational society would accordingly never
choose an application of its collective consumption technology which resulted
in g < 0. So there is no loss in generality in defining the technology for
g ^ only and thereby confining the functions A* to N*" to the positive quadrant.
15. Samuel son's polar pare public good is of course a limiting case of a
collective consumption technology which exhibits neither congestion nor rivalry;
i.e. n S 5 y, or g*E = A* . The iso- A contours in {g»N} space are
horizontal because, with no congestion, the collective service flow is invariant
with respect to community size Similarly, the iso-g contours in (A,Nj space
are horizontal, no addition to the community's collective facility being necessary
to accommodate a marginal community member at a given level of collective
consumption.
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16. Since the mode amilar, we shall rot elaborate it here. We
assume all the standard properties of production functions - i. e. , linear
homogeneity of degree one, strict concavity and the Inada conditions - and
we assume competitive pricing and in tantaneous cleari.ig of all markets.
See Kemp (1969).
17. Clearly the collective facility cannot be traded, since it is defined
as employing domestic >r to provide collective services to community
members.
,*
18. We are concerned in this paper with describing the cornmunity only
at a point in time. However, with perfect intertemporal markets there
should be a complete indifference between purchasing the durable good or
purchasing its services.
19. Note that per capita here is defined under the rescaled units of
measurement of N, where N = I is the number of LCC's.
20. See footnote 19.
21. Since gl(^) - for (N.
v
> N > i there can in principle be more
than two solutions. However, it appears justifiable to assume that the nega*
income effect will dominate the substitution-effect over this range of N. We
can expect consumers to display an increasing reluctance to trade private for
collective consumption as y falls with' community size expansion. In any evenl
the existence of more than two solutions does not affect any of the above
results in any substan manner. All it does is give us additional local ex-
trema in v(N)
.
22. We make this assumption for expository purposes. It mean: that
both the substitution and income effects of an increase in tt operate in the same
direction. If G were exported, we would have to contend with the complication
of a positive income effect. This can be readily handled. See Hillman (1973),
chapters 4 and 5.
23. Since we have been concerned with an optimal sharing problem, our
model is similar in spirit to models such as Pauly and Redisch's ! not-for
profit hospital as physician's cooperative' (1973) and Edelson's highway
sharing problem with congestion toils under monopoly (1971).
24. I.e.
,
the optimum can be compared with some other outcome and
appropiiate correctionary policy -- if required -- can be formulated. For
this we also require a complete theory of individual consumer behavior in a
market for collective goods via locational choice. See Hillman (1973), chapters
6 and 7.
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